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THE DOCTRINE OF YOUNGER v. HARRIS:
DEFERENCE IN SEARCH OF
A RATIONALE
Martin H. Redisht
INTRODUCTION

Younger v. Harris' and its companion cases2 in most instances
prohibit a federal court from enjoining an ongoing state criminal
proceeding.3 In the last seven years, the Court has substantially expanded this doctrine's scope, 4 and commentators have expounded endlessly on its implications.5 Despite these efforts, however, there remains confusion over the theoretical foundations of
Younger deference. In deciding Younger, the Supreme Court did
make it clear that it was invoking a type of federalistic deference to
state institutions.6 Indeed, the author of Younger, Justice Black,
t Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1970, Harvard University.
1401 U.S. 37 (1971). In light of the enormous amount of scholarship already produced on Younger (see sources cited in note 5 infra), this Article will not detail either the
facts of Younger or the historical development of the Younger doctrine. Particularly good
discussions of these matters are: Whitten, FederalDeclaratory and Injunctive Interference with
State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of JudicialDiscretion, 53 N.C.L. REV.
591 (1975); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133,
1274-82 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
I Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401
U.S. 216 (1971).
3 The Court has recently extended the doctrine to civil cases, at least where the state is
a party to the action. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See notes 80-81, 93-94, and accompanying text infra.
4 See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
5
See, e.g., Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil
Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REv. 27 (1976); Geltner,
Some Thoughts on the Limiting of Younger v. Harris, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 744 (1971); Kennedy &
Schoonover, Federal Declaratoy and Injunctive Relief Under the Burger Court, 26 Sw. L.J. 282
(1972); Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and
Beond, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 1324 (1972); B. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and
the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 740 (1974); Whitten, supra note 1; Comment, PostYounger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A CriticalAnalysis, 1976 DUKE UJ. 523;
Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1274-1330.
6 The Younger Court also based its decision on grounds of equity (401 U.S. at 43-44),
presumably independent of federalism concerns. The Court cited the traditional rule "that
courts of equity... should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving
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described the analytical basis for federal court restraint-in a man'7
ner reminiscent of 1940's radio serial tides-as "Our Federalism."
In Justice Black's words, the concept envisions
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests
of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and
protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to
do so in ways that will8 not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.
At another point, Justice Black explained the basis for "comity" as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. 9
party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Id. Whether the Court intended the equity branch of the Younger decision to
play a major role in the doctrine's rationale is unclear. Recently, however, the Court has
relegated this concern to the background. For example, in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434 (1977), the Court applied the Younger doctrine, even though the case involved no
criminal element.
One commentator has recognized the inappropriateness of the Court's reliance on
equitable principles:
The various restrictions upon injunctive relief had their origin in the early
English chancery practice, when equity and law were considered to be wholly
separate systems. . . . [The] widespread consolidation of law and equity courts
raises the question whether the functions once served by the ancient chancery
principles controlling the issuance of injunctions are still served by the retention of
such principles in a merged system.
... [T]he rule that a criminal prosecution will not be enjoined in the absence
of a showing of "irreparable injury" is demonstrably unsound in a merged system,
at least in so far as it represents an absolute principle restricting the availability of
injunctive relief.... [W]hen a single court is competent to administer both legal
and equitable remedies, it makes little sense to retain a remedial standard that was
originally designed to confine a separate court of equity within its proper sphere.
Whitten, supra note 1, at 611-13. As Professor Fiss has suggested of a precursor to Younger
(Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943)), Younger might "be faulted for its use of
doctrines of equity-doctrines forged in the battles of English Chancery-to further views
of federalism, a political principle central to American government." Fiss, Dombrowski, 86
YALE L.J. 1103, 1107 (1977).
If the federalism elements of the Younger doctrine were to fall, equitable principles
alone could probably not continue to sustain it. Therefore this Article proceeds on the
assumption that interests of federalism constituted the driving force behind adoption of
the Younger doctrine.
7 401 U.S. at 44.
8

9

Id.

Id.
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BASES FOR YOUNGER DEFERENCE

Thus a fear of unduly impinging upon "state interests" supports, at
least in large part, Younger and its progeny.
The Court, however, has never satisfactorily delimited the
range of state "interests" or state institutions constituting the intended beneficiaries of this considerable federalistic deference.
The Court has, at times, specifically considered the nature of state
interests deserving protection.1 0 But many of these statements, as
well as many of the Court's actions in developing and applying the
Younger doctrine, appear internally inconsistent or contradictory."
More important, detailed exposition of the nature and scope of the
relevant state interests has been virtually nonexistent. The Court's
words rarely go beyond the ambiguous rhetoric of Younger itself br
the superficial and conclusory assertion that failure to invoke
Younger deference will jeopardize the viability of a certain state institution or state interest.12 Although commentators have attempted
to elaborate on the proper rationale for Younger deference,13 none
has provided a totally satisfying analysis.
A broad deference to state institutions without a firm theoretical foundation delimiting its scope unquestionably does not serve
the interests of federalism. Moreover, clarification of the appropriate theoretical rationales for Younger deference could drastically
alter the current state of the doctrine, and perhaps lead to its
substantial rejection. With these considerations in mind, this Article
explores the alternative rationales for the deference given to states
under the Younger doctrine.

THE BASIS FOR

Younger

DEFERENCE:

ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES

In developing the Younger doctrine, the Court has suggested
four conceivable bases for limiting the injunctive powers of federal
courts: (1) the desire to avoid slighting state courts by questioning
their competence or willingness to enforce federal constitutional
10See notes 32-44, 58-63, and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 66-81 and accompanying text infra.
12 The Court's decision last term in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431

U.S. 434 (1977), the

most recent expansion of Younger, epitomizes this problem. In Trainor, neither the majority
nor the dissent adequately addressed the theoretical implications of their positions. See

notes 80-81, 91, and accompanying text infra.
"See,

e.g., Bartels, supra note 5, at 62-65; Maraist, supra note 5, at 1333-35, 1338-40;

Note, Younger Grows Older: Equitable Abstention in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870,
874-87 (1975).
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rights; (2) the need to prevent interference with the orderly functioning of state judicial processes; (3) the need to avoid federal
interference with substantive state legislative policies and goals; and
(4) the desire to preserve the discretion of state executive officers
in general and state prosecutors in particular. 1 4 The multifaceted
nature of the Court's rationale for its federalistic deference does
not necessarily imply either confusion or contradiction in the
Younger line of decisions. An examination of the doctrine's development, however, demonstrates that the Court's holdings and
15
supporting rationales are often inconsistent or internally flawed.
Before undertaking such an examination, we must explore how the
Court has, at various stages of the Younger doctrine's development,
manifested in either language or action its reliance on the four
alternative bases of deference.
A. Avoiding Affront to the State Courts
"In the scheme of the Constitution," wrote Professor Henry
Hart, state courts "are the primary guarantors of constitutional
14 In addition, the Younger doctrine may be favored by "those eager to reduce the
activities of the federal courts. This approach stresses either the beleaguered, docketcluttered posture of the federal judiciary today or the relatively low priority-from some
unarticulated national viewpoint-of some of the claims raised in Younger-type cases." Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1285 (citing H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 87-91 (1973)). It seems the height of irony, however, to attempt to reduce
the backlog in the federal courts by largely removing their authority to hear federal civil
rights actions. According to the Supreme Court, one of the central reasons for congressional adoption of the precursor to § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts as a safeguard against state interference with an individual's constitutional rights. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 513-14 (1973) (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972). Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 473 (1974) (referring to "the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights"). To reduce overcrowding, it would be more logical to cut back on the
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, where expertise in the development of federal law is
whol*' irrelevant. Cf. Shapiro, FederalDiversityJurisdiction:A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 317, 321-24 (1977) (increased burden of overcrowding on federal courts casts
doubt on need for uniform federal diversity jurisdiction).
Is Professor Fiss has suggested that "at the heart of . . . the progeny of 'Our
Federalism' . . . is more than a concern that federal courts should not interfere in state
agencies." Fiss, supra note 6, at 1159. Professor Fiss speculates "that the overarching spirit
of the Burger Court is a hostility toward the activism of judges, not just federal judges.
'Federalism' is but one handle available to the Supreme Court for curbing some of the
more ambitious-more idealistic-projects of its own judges." Id. at 1160 (footnote omitted). If the Court's doctrine of "Our Federalism" is simply a disguise for the desire to limit
judicial power to protect civil liberties, any analysis that takes the Court at its word might
be guilty of the grossest naivete. But an analysis that successfully refutes the Court's asserted rationale may at least possess the virtue of exposing the Court's unarticulated
rationale.
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rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones.
The
framers specifically declined to require creation of lower federal courts because of the availability of state courts to enforce
federal law.' 7 Indeed, not until 1875 did Congress provide lower
federal courts with a general power to hear cases arising under federal law. 18 Even after establishment of general federal jurisdiction
to hear federal cases, concurrent jurisdiction over such cases has, in

the Supreme Court's words, "been a common phenomenon."' 19
Exclusive federal jurisdiction-either express or implied-is the exception rather than the rule. ° Moreover, the Supremacy Clause2 '
binds state courts to apply relevant federal law. Therefore, state
courts determining issues of federal law effectively sit as "federalized" courts, with the same power and responsibility as federal
courts to enforce constitutional principles. Thus, federal injunctions of on-going state criminal proceedings could be challenged
as aspersions on the ability of state courts to meet the obligations
imposed upon them by the Constitution.
The Court often refers to this principle in invoking federal
judicial deference. In Douglas v. City ofJeannette,2 2 an early precursor
of Younger, Chief Justice Stone noted that "lawfulness or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is
based may be determined as readily in the [state] criminal case as in
a suit for an injunction. 2 3 In Dombrowski v. Pfister,24 a 1965 decision considered by many to be a rejection of the deference recognized in Douglas,25 dissenting Justice Harlan criticized the majority for making "the unarticulated assumption that state courts will
not be as prone as federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights

"6Hart,

The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in

Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1401 (1953).
17 See Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal
Courts: A CriticalReview and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 52-56 (1975).
1SAct of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (repealed by Judicial Code Act of
1911, ch. 231, § 297, 36 Stat. 1087). Congress first granted general federal-question jurisdiction in 1801 (Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89), but repealed it soon thereafter (Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132). C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 5 (3d ed. 1976).
19 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962).
20
See Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH.
L. REv. 311, 313-14 (1976).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
22 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
23
1Id. at 163.
24 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
25 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 6.
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promptly and effectively. 26
Since Younger, the Court has emphasized the need to avoid the
"unseemly failure to give effect to the principle that state courts
have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts 'to
guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States.' ",27 Citing this concern, the
Court has held that the Younger doctrine does not bar declaratory
or preliminary injunctive relief against a future, as opposed to a
pending, state prosecution.2 8 According to the Court, such relief
does not impugn the abilities of state judges, since "the relevant
principles of equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force in the
absence of a pending state proceeding.' ",29
B. Avoiding Interference with Substantive State Legislative Goals
Less obvious in the Younger line of cases than the desire to
avoid impugning the ability of state courts is the Court's interest in
avoiding federal interference with substantive state legislative goals
and policies. Nevertheless, the Court in Younger arguably relied on
this basis for deference when it found that comity represented the
desire of the federal government "not unduly [to] interfere with
the legitimate activities of the States." 30 The Court's statement was
markedly broad and in no way limited to the judicial activities of
3
the states. '
Stronger support for this rationale developed in Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd.,"2 a 1975 decision in which the Court held Younger
applicable to a nuisance proceeding brought by the state.3 3 In finding Younger's applicability not limited to purely criminal cases, Jus26 380 U.S. at 499 (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.). Justice Harlan added that "[s]uch
an assumption should not be indulged in the absence of a showing that such is apt to be so
in a given case." Id.
27 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111
U.S. 624, 637 (1884)). See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
2
'E.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (declaratory relief); Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (preliminary injunctive relief). See notes 71-75 infra.
29 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 462 (quoting Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)).
30 401 U.S. at 44. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
31 The Court in Younger also spoke of the state's interest in "carrying out the important
and necessary task of enforcing [its] laws against socially harmful conduct." 401 U.S. at
51-52.
32 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
33 In Huffman, state officials had filed an action under Ohio's public nuisance statute
against the operator of a theater showing pornographic films. Id. at 595.
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tice Rehnquist noted that "[t]he seriousness of federal judicial interference with state civil functions has long been recognized by
this Court. ' 34 He cited the statement of Justice Holmes "that no
injunction ought to issue against officers of a State clothed with
authority to enforce the law in question, unless in a case reasonably
free from doubt and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury. ' 35 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the same type of
deference applied in cases involving judicial, rather than executive,
action. 3 6 The Court emphasized that "while in this case the District
Court's injunction has not directly disrupted Ohio's criminal justice
to protect the very insystem, it has disrupted that State's efforts
37
terests which underlie its criminal laws."
The clearest manifestation of this form of Younger deference
came last term in Trainor v. Hernandez. 8 In Trainor, the Illinois
Department of Public Aid brought a civil action in state court to
recoup welfare payments allegedly obtained through fraud. The
Department obtained a writ of attachment pursuant to the Illinois
Attachment Act 39 against the defendants' assets without notice or
hearing. The Supreme Court held that a federal district court
lacked authority under Younger to enjoin the attachment.
Noting that Younger relied "on cases that declared that courts
of equity should give 'scrupulous regard [to] the rightful independence of state governments,' "40 the Trainor Court emphasized that
while the state proceeding was wholly civil, "the fact remains that
the State was a party to the suit in its role of administering its
public-assistance programs."' 4 1 Furthermore, "[b]oth the suit and
the accompanying writ of attachment were brought to vindicate
important state policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of
those programs. '"42 The Court found both Younger and Huffman
34

Id. at 603.
35 Id. (quoting Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527 (1926)).
36
Id. at 604.
37 Id. at 604-05. Justice Rehnquist "apparently saw in Younger a broad policy of deference to important state functions that applies whenever state officials have instituted proceedings in state court." Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1308.
38 431 U.S. 434 (1977). Trainorrepresents the furthest extension to date of Younger deference. In Huffman, the Court abandoned rigid adherence to the limitation of Younger to
criminal cases, but emphasized the quasi-criminal nature of the nuisance statute. 420 U.S.
at 604-05. Trainorcontains no such quasi-criminal element.
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 1-44 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
40 431 U.S. at 441.
41
1d. at 444.
42
Id.
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broad enough to apply to a civil proceeding "brought by the State
in its sovereign capacity. ' '43 Most significantly, the Court noted that
"in the case before us the state statute was invalidated and a federal
injunction prohibited state officers from using or enforcing the
impact on
attachment statute for any purpose. The eviscerating
44
many state enforcement actions is readily apparent.
C. Avoiding Interference with the Exercise of Discretion by
State Executive Officers
In Younger the Court expressed concern that issuance of federal declaratory or injunctive relief would impede the proper performance of a state executive officer's duties: "Ordinarily, there
should be no interference with [state] officers [empowered to institute criminal actions]; primarily, they are charged with the duty of
prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State and must decide
45
when and how this is to be done.
In Rizzo v. Goode,46 the most controversial extension of Younger,
the Court expressed even broader concern for preserving state
executive discretion. The district court in Rizzo found that the
Philadelphia Police had engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional
conduct and that the police disciplinary system had failed to deter
such conduct. 4 7 As a result, the court granted wide-ranging equitable relief, revising the structure of the police disciplinary system.48
In reversing, the Supreme Court relied on three independent
bases: (1) the named plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action; 49 (2) the district court incorrectly concluded that the failure of
police superiors to rectify the alleged unconstitutional conduct constituted a civil rights violation; 50 and (3) "important considerations
of federalism" 51 weighed against the relief granted below. In discussing the third basis for its decision, the Court invoked Younger
principles. Noting that "the principles of equity, comity, and federalism" ' 52 had been held to restrain a federal court from enjoin43

Id.

44Id. at 445-46.
45401 U.S. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926)).
46

423 U.S. 362 (1976).

47 COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Rizzo v.

Goode, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
4id. at 1322.
49 423 U.S. at 371-73.
50 Id. at 373-77.
51 Id. at 378.
"Id. at 379 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)).
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ing on-going state proceedings, the Court concluded: "We think
these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is
sought, not against the judicial branch of the state government, but
against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state
'53
or local governments such as petitioners here.
The fear of insulting state courts played no role in Rizzo; there
was no relevant pending or prospective state judicial action. Rather, the desire to avoid federal judicial interference with the discretionary operation of state and local executive agents prompted
application of the Younger doctrine. Such deference presumably
would also extend to such institutions as state prisons, schools, and
54
mental hospitals.
In these situations the basis for federal judicial deference derives as much from a concern for preventing interference with the
exercise of executive expertise as from principles of federalism. In
addition to relying on the Younger line of cases, the Rizzo Court
found support in "the well-established rule that the Government
has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the 'dispatch of
its own internal affairs.' -5 The federal judiciary has long expressed this respect for governmental expertise in its review of coordinate federal branches. 56 Perhaps the Rizzo Court believed that
the presence of both federalism and expertise factors reinforced
each other in mandating a hands-off approach.5 7
53

id. at 380.
54 Courts have traditionally applied what was known as the "hands-off" doctrine in
reviewing the activities of these institutions. The result was virtually equivalent to a broad
reading of Rizzo; in the context of prisons, it "precludes an examination of even the allegations of a complaint and thus prevents a determination of whether the prisoner has presented a claim warranting relief." Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 507 (1963). Recently, however,

the Supreme Court has, in varying degrees, reviewed the constitutionality of the activities
of state and local public institutions. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(prisons); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(schools).
55423 U.S. at 378-79 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896
(1961)).
6
" See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
57 The Court in Rizzo failed to discuss the future role of state courts in the review of
state executive discretion. It is well established that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts in § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Long v. District of Columbia, 469 F.2d 927,
937 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J.) (supplemental opinion denying rehearing). Furthermore,
a grant of concurrent jurisdiction may generally be presumed where a federal statute does
not expressly provide otherwise. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08
(1962); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876). The Court did not'make clear
whether the judicial deference required of federal courts applied as well to the state
judiciary. Clearly the future development of the Rizzo standard will depend upon whether
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D. Avoiding Interference with the Orderly Operation of
State JudicialProcesses
The fourth suggested basis for Younger deference is essentially
a combination of the previous three. Reluctance to interfere with
the orderly functioning of state judicial processes may emanate
from a desire not to impede enforcement of the state's laws or
substantive policies. 5 8 It may also reflect a desire neither to interfere with the discretion of state executive officers nor to disparage
59
the competence of state judges.
In another sense, the desire to avoid disrupting state judicial
processes can be viewed as an independent basis for federal deference. The state retains an independent interest in not having its
judicial process grind to a halt while the federal courts decide constitutional questions. States may also legitimately seek to avoid conducting duplicative proceedings resulting from simultaneous litigation of the same case in state and federal courts. 60 The Court
recognized both interests in two decisions handed down last term,
Juidice v. Vail 61 and Trainor v. Hernandez.62 In Juidice, the Court
applied Younger to restrict federal judicial power to enjoin a state
court's use of its civil contempt power. Speaking for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist stated:
A State's interest in the contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system, so long as that
system itself affords the opportunity to pursue federal claims
within it, is surely an important interest.... The contempt power
lies at the core of the administration of a State's judicial system
63

In Trainor, the Court emphasized that allowing a federal court to
enjoin the state's attachment of the defendant's assets would subject
its holding rested primarily on federalism concerns or stemmed from the desire to accommodate executive expertise regardless of the forum.
58 See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1283 (referring to "independent, a priori
value in permitting the smooth and unimpeded operation of the collection of procedures
that make up the normal course of criminal justice"). See also Note, supra note 13, at 878
(discussing "the state's interests in the integrity and continuity of its judicial processes").
" Recently, the Court has recognized that some of these same interests dictate federal
judicial restraint in certain noncriminal cases as well. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 444 (1977).
60 See, e.g., id. at 445.
61 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
62 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
63 430 U.S. at 335. The Court also noted that federal judicial interference might reflect
negatively on the abilities of state judges. Id. at 336.
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the state to the burdens of litigating simultaneously in state and
federal courts.6 4 Principles of federalism, the Court held, dictated
that the state judicial process progress to its conclusion free from
federal interference.6 5
II
THE ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR

A

Younger

DEFERENCE:

STUDY IN CONFUSION AND CONTRADICTION

The existence of more than one theoretical rationale for
Younger deference does not necessarily give rise to confusion or
inconsistency; each rationale may simply supplement the other
three. On numerous occasions, however, the Court's actions, seemingly logical outgrowths of one basis for deference, have collided
with one or more of the alternative rationales.
The earliest inconsistency appeared in Younger itself, where the
Court recognized that the threat of extraordinary irreparable injury could justify departure from the doctrine of federal judicial
restraint.6 6 The Court recognized two situations in which such a
threat would permit a federal court to enjoin an on-going state
criminal proceeding: (1) where the prosecution is brought in bad
faith or designed to harass the defendant;67 and (2) where the
statute under which the prosecution is brought is "flagrantly and
patently violative of express consitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it."6 8 The
first of the two represents a limitation on deference to state prosecutors: Although a prosecutor may have discretion to enforce the
state's criminal laws as he or she deems fit, the prosecutor abuses
that discretion when no realistic hope of conviction exists and prosecution amounts to harassment of the defendant. The second situation constitutes an exception to deference to substantive legislative goals: The state lacks discretion to attain goals that are
64 431 U.S. at 445.
65
Id.at 446.
66 401 U.S. at 46. The Court noted that, "in view of the fundamental policy against
federal interference with state criminal prosecutions, even irreparable injury is insufficient
unless it is 'both great and immediate.'" Id. (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243
(1926)).
67
See id. at 49, 53-54. The Court found that the appellee had "failed to make any
showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for
equitable relief." Id. at 54.
68
Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
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"flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional. Both of these exceptions,
however, subvert another of the four justifications for deference:
the reluctance to impugn the abilities or motives of state courts. If a
significant basis for federal judicial restraint is the traditional competence of state courts to enforce constitutional rights, state courts
should be equally competent to recognize and dismiss prosecutions
brought in bad faith. 9 Similarly, state courts should be able to
recognize the invalidity of the state law when the challenged statute
is flagrantly unconstitutional,7 0 if in no other circumstance.
71
Examination of the Court's decisions in Steffel v. Thompson
and Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.7 2 reveals further inconsistencies among
proposed rationales for Younger deference. Reasoning that the
principles of Younger have little applicability in the absence of an
on-going judicial proceeding, these two decisions authorized declaratory and preliminary injunctive relief,73 respectively, against
69 It has been argued that "[s]ince the harm [lies] in the fact of a bad-faith prosecution
rather than its outcome, a criminal defense [is] an inadequate remedy." Fiss, supra note 6,
at 1114. However, the relevance of the prosecutor's motive to the adequacy of the
criminal-defense remedy is difficult to understand. In certain cases, the very fact of prosecution, rather than the ultimate conviction, gives rise to a first amendment violation, because the indictment itself may unduly chill the exercise of the right of free expression.
But the motivation of the prosecutor is logically irrelevant in determining the existence of
the chilling effect. Even a good-faith prosecution may result in a chill if the prosecutor is
overzealous in the performance of his duties. Conversely, where the defendant did not
contemplate a plan of continuous conduct, only the ultimate conviction might infringe first
amendment rights, even if the prosecution is instigated in bad faith.
70 While the Court in Younger recognized the existence of these exceptions, subsequent
decisions have generally given them an extremely narrow construction. For post-Younger
interpretations of the bad-faith exception, see Johnson v. McNary, 414 F. Supp. 684 (E.D.
Miss. 1975); Luongo v. Wenzel, 404 F. Supp. 874 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Stewart v. Dameron,
345 F. Supp. 1086 (M.D. La. 1972). Cf. Fiss, supra note 6, at 1115 (referring to "the
enormous evidentiary difficulty faced by a litigant in proving" bad faith).
Last term, in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), the Court substantially undermined the "patently unconstitutional" exception. See id. at 463 (dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.).
71 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
72 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
73
Doran is limited by its facts to preliminary injunctive relief. The Court has yet to
determine whether permanent as well as preliminary injunctive relief may be issued against
a threatened state prosecution. However, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court in Doran, apparently drew a distinction between the invasion of state interests caused by permanent injunctive relief on the one hand and declaratory relief on the other:
At the conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state statute or local ordinance, a district court can generally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by
entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive medicine
will be unnecessary. But prior to final judgment there is no established declaratory
remedy comparable to a preliminary injunction; unless preliminary relief is available upon a proper showing, plaintiffs in some situations may suffer unnecessary
and substantial irreparable harm.
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future criminal prosecutions, even absent one of the Younger exceptions. In Steffel the Court reasoned that the "principles of equity,
comity, and federalism 'have little force in the absence of a pending
state proceeding,' "7 since interference with a threatened prosecution would not "result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention . . . be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state
75
court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.
The reasoning of Steffel, however, clashes with two possible
bases for Younger deference: the desire to avoid federal judicial
interference with state prosecutorial discretion and the fear of impeding accomplishment of substantive state legislative goals. Empowering federal courts to issue declaratory or injunctive relief
against a planned prosecution offends prosecutorial discretion to
the same extent as permitting federal injunctions against on-going
prosecutions; 76 in both instances, a federal court tells the prosecutor "when and how" 7 7-and indeed if-he is to bring a prosecution. Moreover, Steffel disregards the desire, often expressed in
the Younger line of cases, 78 to reduce federal judicial interference
with the achievement of state substantive policies. It is irrelevant
whether accomplishment of these policies is undermined by halting
a prosecution about to be brought or one that is already in motion.
The majority and dissenting opinions in both Huffman and
Trainor have led to further confusion over the role played in
Younger by the desire to avoid affronting state courts. Both cases
Id. at 931. This distinction is somewhat puzzling, in light of the Court's earlier statement in
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), that "ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result
in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid." Id. at 72.
74 415 U.S. at 462 (quoting Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509
(1972)).
75

Id.

76 Justice Stewart has suggested that the Court's decision in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.

332 (1975), "trivializes" the Steffel doctrine. Id. at 353 (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.). In
Hicks the Court held that, in a declaratory action, if a state prosecution is filed before
"proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force." Id. at 349. Hicks did undermine the
value of Steffel to federal plaintiffs, since a state prosecutor may now respond to a federal
declaratory action with a state-court indictment. However, Doran allows plaintiffs in certain
federal declaratory actions to obtain a temporary restraining order, thus preventing the
state prosecutor from avoiding the federal action.
77 As the Court stated in Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926), and reaffirmed in
Younger (401 U.S. at 45), state prosecutors "are charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State and must decide when and how this is to be done."
271 U.S.
at 243-44.
78 See notes 30-44 and accompanying text supra.
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concerned the degree to which Younger should apply to noncriminal cases. If, as Justice Brennan suggested in Steffel, the
applicability of Younger is to turn primarily on the degree of insult
to the state judiciary resulting from federal interference with the
conduct of state cases, 7 9 logic would dictate that whether the state
80
action sought to be restrained was criminal in nature is irrelevant.
Even if the action were civil, restraint of the state-court action by a
federal court would insult the state court by questioning its competence to decide the issues involved. Yet in both Huffman and
Trainor,Justice Brennan, the author of Steffel, vigorously dissented
from the extension of Younger beyond the narrow confines of criminal cases. 81 The majorities in Huffman and Trainor did not counter
the arguments of the dissent by invoking the simple logic described
above. While relying partially upon the "insult to state courts" rationale, 2 the majority in neither case limited the theory of decision to that basis of deference. Instead, the Court emphasized the
strong substantive state legislative interest and the state's presence
as a party to the litigation.8 3 The decisions thus leave open the issue
of whether Younger deference will be applied to a purely private
civil case. Yet if, as the Court intimated in Steffel, the prime factor
favoring application of Younger deference is the desire to avoid
affronting state courts, the presence of strong state substantive interests in a case would seem to have little relevance.
We are thus left with a contradiction. Steffel implies that
Younger deference will not apply even if the result is interference
79 415 U.S. at 462.
80 One commentator has suggested that
a private civil proceeding would appear to pose fewer problems [of affronting
state courts than a criminal proceeding]. It generally is more freewheeling in
structure and uncertain in scope; as a result, especially in the period shortly after
the filing of the complaint, it is unlikely that a federal decision on an issue will
have the directly intrusive quality present in the paradigm fact situation.
Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1313 n.228. This analysis confuses two subtly but
significantly different bases for Younger deference: the desire to avoid insulting state courts
and the desire to avoid interference with the smooth functioning of the state judicial process. While purporting to deal with the former, the statement is directed more towards the
latter. The fact that a state civil proceeding is "generally . . . more freewheeling in structure and uncertain in scope" than a criminal proceeding is irrelevant in determining
whether federal interference insults the abilities of state courts. Federal relief in a state civil
action does not insult the abilities of state judges any less than similar relief in a state
criminal prosecution; in both cases, the availability of federal relief might imply that state
judges are unwilling or unable to interpret and protect federal rights.
"I See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 613-18; Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at
455-56.
82 See 420 U.S. at 604; 431 U.S. at 443-44.
s See 420 U.S. at 604-05; 431 U.S. at 444.
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with the achievement of state legislative goals, as long as federal
judicial action in no way questions the competence of state courts.
Yet both the majority and dissenting opinions in Trainor intimate
that insult to the state judiciary, absent interference with the
achievement of state legislative goals, is an insufficient basis for
Younger deference. This state of theoretical confusion surrounding
the Younger doctrine necessitates a broad reexamination of the four
asserted rationales for Younger deference, in an attempt to determine which, if any, justify the wide-ranging federal deference
mandated by Younger and its progeny.
III
THE ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR

A

Younger

DEFERENCE:

SLIDING SCALE CRITIQUE AND A SUGGESTED REVISION

None of the four conceivable bases for the Younger doctrine
clearly stands out as the definitive justification for federal judicial
deference. Each is subject to serious criticism, yet certain of the
asserted justifications are more compelling in their logic than
others. The four justifications effectively break down into two
sub-groups: two virtually without merit and two deserving of more
careful analysis.
A. Deference to Substantive State Goals and Executive Discretion:
A Matter of Definitional Confusion
The desire to avoid interference with substantive legislative
goals and the desire to defer to the discretion of state executive
officers should play no role in delimiting the scope of Younger
deference. This is not to say that these interests should play no role
in federal judicial decisionmaking. They are, however, functionally
irrelevant to the application of Younger deference.
Younger deference might appropriately be labeled "procedural" in nature. Except for the comparatively narrow exceptions
mentioned in Younger itself, deference under the doctrine is total in
scope.8 4 The federal court makes no decision on the merits of
plaintiff's constitutional claims. Instead, the court informs the
plaintiff that he has brought his claim to the wrong forum-in
"' See Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 498 (1977) (suggesting that Younger "bar[s] the federal courthouse door in the absence
of showings probably impossible to make") (footnote omitted). Last term in Trainorthe Court
read one of the exceptions recognized in Younger so narrowly as virtually to exclude it. See
note 70 supra.
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effect, that he followed an incorrect procedure in seeking to adjudicate his constitutional claim. Although this may seem obvious to
most observers, it is nevertheless vital in restricting the reach of the
Younger doctrine, and all too often seems to have been forgotten by
the Supreme Court.
In its desire to promote the interests of federalism by reducing
federal interference with the attainment of state objectives, the
Court has incorrectly squeezed a form of "substantive" deference
into a wholly procedural doctrine. The federal judiciary should
allow state legislatures and executive officers, who presumably
know best the unique needs and problems of their locale, some
degree of freedom of operation. Moreover, if we are to encourage
state governments to act as social "laboratories," 85 each attempting
to meet its own needs in its own way, it makes sense for the federal
judiciary to restrain itself, at least to a certain extent, in enforcing
federal constitutional limits on state activity. But courts should
employ such deference in a "substantive" manner-i.e., in making
the constitutional decision on the merits. Thus, when a federal
court is asked to restrain or invalidate state legislative or executive
conduct, it may properly consider in its constitutional calculus the
interests of the state and its officers in controlling their own affairs.8 6 But Younger deference does not allow for such a calculus,
since under Younger the federal court makes no decision on the
merits at all; it merely concludes that it is an inappropriate forum
for such a decision.
Paradoxically, applying Younger on the basis of these substantive concerns may dangerously provide more deference than is
appropriate, while at the same time insufficiently articulating and
protecting the legitimate interests of the states in attaining their
goals. The former occurs because Younger deference is virtually
total in its scope; the court refrains from examining the asserted
5

" See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.") (dissenting opinion, Brandeis, J.).
" For example, in Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 424 U.S. 902
(1976), the Seventh Circuit held that a federal court has the power to revise a police disciplinary system, and directed the district court to formulate relief "designed to stop deprivations of constitutional rights without unnecessary encroachment upon local government
functions." Id. at 7. The court noted that "the framing of equitable relief will be a delicate
and difficult process." Id. The decision was summarily reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its decision in Rizzo. 424 U.S. at 902.
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state legislative goal or exercise of state executive discretion in determining whether it withstands constitutional analysis. This may
allow the very body charged with a violation of constitutional rights
to sit as the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of its actions. If
Rizzo is to be read for all it is worth,8 7 federal courts might afford
local police, prison wardens, or directors of mental hospitals the
same type of procedural deference afforded the state judiciary
under Younger, thus freeing them from any federal judicial overview.
Alternatively, if Rizzo and Trainor imply merely that the burden for adjudicating the constitutionality of state legislation and
executive acts will fall entirely on the state courts, 88 Younger deference has not sufficiently protected the interests it sought to protect,
for as already noted, the state courts are as obligated as the federal
courts to enforce constitutional rights. 89 Indeed, a central purpose
of the Younger doctrine is to avoid implying that state judges will
not protect constitutional rights as vigorously or as competently as
87 Several lower courts have construed Rizzo to require only the kind of careful balancing engaged in by the Seventh Circuit in Calvin. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122,
1131 (8th Cir. 1977) (Rizzo "simply emphasized the settled proposition that under our federal system of government the federal courts should be most reluctant to interfere in local
governmental affairs and should do so only where the case is clear and the need . . . [is]
urgent."). See also Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1069 (7th Cir. 1976).
Such an interpretation, however, does not comport with Justice Rehnquist's sweeping language in Rizzo. See text accompanying notes 46-57 supra.
88 In such situations there would be no on-going state judicial proceedings; therefore,
this interpretation contemplates that plaintiffs would be required to seek their injunctive
relief in the first instance in the state courts.
89 See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
One distinguished judge has argued that "it must be more acceptable if a state statute
is struck down as offending the Federal Constitution by state judges, often elected by the
people, than by federal judges owing their appointment to Washington." H. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 90 (1973). The logic of such a position, however,
is difficult to comprehend. In either case the ultimate result is the same: the state legislative scheme is aborted because of a conflict with the federal Constitution. At any rate,
Professor Neuborne has persuasively argued that the notion
that federal district judges, when called upon to enforce the fourteenth amendment against local officials, resemble an alien, occupying army dispatched from
Washington to rule over a conquered province . . . must be dispelled. Federal
judges are chosen from the geographical area they serve. Generally, they are appointed with the consent and often at the behest of a senator representing the
state in which they will sit, frequently after local officials and citizen groups have
had the opportunity to make their views on the nominee known. To characterize
federal judges as carpetbaggers, unaware of, and insensitive to, local concerns is
thus inaccurate and serves to deflect attention from the relative efficacy of state
and federal forums in enforcing constitutional norms.
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1120 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
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their federal counterparts.9" Presumably, then, a state court would
invalidate a state legislative scheme or executive action as freely as
would a federal court. It therefore provides no justification for
federal judicial restraint, for example, that the attachment statute
enjoined in Trainor was central to Illinois' legislative scheme; federal judicial restraint presumably will result merely in state judicial
review of the constitutionality of the procedure. If state courts are
equally competent to protect constitutional rights, they should invalidate Illinois' attachment statute as freely as would federal courts.
Thus Younger deference ultimately provides no protection for state
legislative policy. 91
It may be fully appropriate in deciding the constitutional
merits to consider the importance of the attachment scheme to
Illinois' legitimate legislative goals. Due process generally involves
questions of circumstance and degree. But such substantive deference can logically come into force only when a decision is actually
made on the merits; it cannot justify application of the procedural
deference described in Younger.
B.

Deference to State Judges and to the Sanctity of the Judicial Process
The two remaining rationales-the desire to avoid affronting
state courts and the desire to avoid disrupting the orderly workings
of the state judicial process-possess greater legitimacy. Since the
framing of the Constitution, state judges have been considered
competent to enforce and protect federal rights. Thus a strong
argument reasons that authorizing a federal court to enjoin a state
judicial proceeding reflects negatively on state courts, and thus
undermines the framework of cooperative federalism. 92 Moreover,
a federal injunction will invariably interfere with the state judicial
process pending determination of the federal issue in federal
court, resulting in piecemeal state-court litigation.
If we were to stop at this point, we would reject the two
rationales considered in the previous section and accept the two
90 The realities of the situation, however, may be quite different. See generally Neuborne, supra note 89. See also text accompanying notes 103-08 infra.
91 One commentator has suggested that an unwillingness on the part of state courts to
invalidate state laws might serve as an independent justification for Younger deference.
Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1284. Such a suggestion, however, is embarrassingly
inconsistent with what is perhaps the primary basis for Younger deference-namely, the
desire to avoid insulting state judges by questioning their willingness to protect federal
rights. Supporters of Younger cannot have it both ways.
92 See text accompanying notes 97-102 infra. Stating the argument is in no way intended to suggest that I accept it.
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just mentioned. The practical effect of such a conclusion on the
scope of the Younger doctrine raises significant questions. In one
sense, this narrowing of the theoretical rationale for Younger deference paradoxically would expand the doctrine's reach. If attainment of state legislative policies no longer provided an appropriate
justification for Younger deference, whether the state or one of its
agencies was a party to the suit would become logically irrelevant.
If state courts are competent to adjudicate constitutional issues
when the state is a party, they are equally competent to adjudicate
them when the state is not a party. Presumably it is as much an
affront to take a civil case from the grasp of state courts as it is to
take a criminal prosecution.9 3 Thus, limiting Huffman or Trainor to
situations where the state is a party would serve no purpose, and
Younger would be extended to all civil cases in which the defense
invokes a right protected by section 1983. 9' In addition, the "bad
faith" and "patently unconstitutional" exceptions set out in Younger
95
would disappear.
On the other hand, this suggested alteration in the theoretical
basis for Younger would halt the Supreme Court's dangerous extension of Younger to situations where state or local executive action is
challenged but there is no pending judicial proceeding. While
lower federal courts generally have not read Rizzo as broadly as it
could be read,9 6 the case might still be interpreted to allow state
executive officers the same degree of procedural deference as state
courts. State courts, however, are historically and constitutionally
93 If each of the four rationales independently sufficed to justify invoking Younger
deference, it would be irrelevant whether courts accepted all four rationales or only the
final two. In either event, the fear of insulting state judges would remain a recognized
'basis, and it would make no difference whether the state was a party to the proceeding. As
Trainor demonstrates, on occasion the Court has apparently considered the various rationales interdependent. But if one of those interdependent bases were to fall, the Court
would likely continue to employ the remaining rationales as independent bases for deference. Rejection of the first two rationales would logically lead to application of the Younger
doctrine to a wider variety of civil state-court powers traditionally deemed within the domain of federal courts.
94 If Younger were extended to civil cases involving private parties, it is not clear
whether the doctrine would still be limited to § 1983 suits or would apply to any asserted
basis for federal injunctive relief. In Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 97 S. Ct. 2881
(1977), the respondent sought a federal injunction against enforcement of a state judgment
obtained by a party who had allegedly violated the antitrust laws. The petitioner argued
"that principles of equity, comity, and federalism . . . barred the issuance of the injunction." Id. at 2886. Because the Court agreed with the petitioner on another basis for relief,
it did not reach this issue. Id.
9' See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
"6See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
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competent to protect constitutional rights; state executive agencies
are not.
Beyond this brief speculation, we need not concern ourselves
with the effects that might result from a bifurcation of the asserted
rationales for Younger. For although two of the justifications deserve greater weight than the remaining two, ultimately none of
the four asserted bases for Younger deference justifies that doctrine's sweeping limitation on federal judicial authority.
1. Avoiding Insult to State Courts
There are two answers to the argument basing Younger deference on the desire to avoid belittling the abilities or good faith of
state judges. First, allowing an individual to seek enforcement of
his federal rights in federal court does not affront state judges. It is
perfectly logical for an individual to address his federal claim to
those courts whose fundamental purpose is to enforce federal
rights and adjudicate federal law. Affront would result only if an
individual who wished to have his federal rights adjudicated in
state court could not do so. Second, derogation of state judges may,
as a factual matter, be justified.
a. The "absence of insult" argument. Ultimately, the theory that
allowing federal relief to protect constitutional rights after the filing of a state action impugns the competence of state courts is
premised on a fallacy: it disregards the important distinction between allowing state courts to adjudicate federal rights and requiring
litigants to adjudicate those rights in state court. Only the former is
necessary to avoid belittling the abilities of state judges.
When Congress grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
under a particular act, it often implies something negative about
state courts. For example, in granting federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent and copyright
laws, 97 Congress probably was expressing concern over the competence of state courts to adjudicate these issues.9 8 When courts infer
from congressional silence in the antitrust laws concerning statecourt jurisdiction9 9 that jurisdiction to hear cases under these laws
lies only in federal court, 10 0 they are again implying that state
courts lack the competence to protect and develop these federal
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970).
98 Congress might also have been concerned about uniformity of decisions; if so, no

insult to state courts was necessarily intended.
9
" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27, 44 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
100 See cases cited in Redish & Muench, supra note 20, at 316 n.26.
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rights. If it desired to do so, Congress could eradicate these aspersions on the abilities of state courts by granting them jurisdiction
over antitrust and patent cases. This would not require litigants to
bring such cases in state court. It would be the height of absurdity
to argue that general failure of parties to select state courts casts
aspersions on the abilities of state judges. Parties may simply conclude that the most appropriate forum for adjudication of their
federal rights is federal court.
In effect, to the extent that it tries to avoid insulting state
courts, the Younger doctrine makes the mistaken assumption just
described: to avoid any such insult, parties must be required, rather
than merely permitted, to have their federal rights adjudicated in
state court. 10 By permitting parties to adjudicate constitutional issues in state proceedings, Congress has recognized that state courts
are competent to enforce and protect federal rights. 10 2 It makes no
sense to suggest that parties must have their federal rights adjudicated in the state forum to avoid insulting state judges. Therefore,
allowing federal judicial relief against on-going state actions in
order to protect constitutional rights does not necessarily imply a
negative statement about state courts.
b. The "insult deserved" theory. Harsh reality may justify doubts
about the competence of state courts in enforcing federal rights. As
the Supreme Court has made clear, 10 3 congressional mistrust of the
state judiciary was the prime force behind adoption of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,104 the precursor of section 1983. Commentators have long recognized institutional factors that are likely to
raise doubts about the abilities of state judges to protect federal
rights with the same vigor as their federal counterparts.1 05 There
101Difficulties wholly apart from possible insult to state judges may flow from a federal injunction of a state-court action. The leading problem is disruption of the state judicial process. See notes 58-65 and accompanying text supra. Such difficulties may independently justify federal judicial restraint. However, the textual discussion simply points out
that allowing federal injunctive relief does-not necessarily cause any insult to state judges.
102 The Supreme Court has held that a state court may even decide issues in the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts if they are presented as a defense to a state cause of
action. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Such a result is advisable when the
alternative would be disregard of the supremacy of federal law. The findings of state
courts in these matters, however, will often not be given collateral estoppel effect. See, e.g.,
Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955). Thus, decions like
Lear do not depart significantly from the federal judiciary's attitude towards state-court
power to develop certain issues of federal law.
103 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972).
104 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
105 See, e.g., Mishkin, The Federal"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157,
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are exceptions, of course, and there is not yet sufficient statistical
data to establish conclusively the asserted differences between state
and federal courts.10 6 Nonetheless, the disparity is sufficiently
well-recognized to render the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
1 0 7 disingenuous.' 0 8
consider its relevance
No one would dispute the proposition that the interests of
federalism are undermined by gratuitous slights of state judges.
But federal courts should not avoid such slights at the cost of
sacrificing their primary role as enforcers and protectors of federal
rights.
2.

Avoiding Interference with the State JudicialProcess
Perhaps the strongest justification for Younger deference is the
recognized need to avoid disrupting the state judicial process. This
principle has long served as an essential element of federalism.
Virtually from the nation's beginning, the Anti-Injunction Statute' 0 9 has prohibited federal courts from enjoining state judicial
proceedings in most circumstances. 1 0 Justice Black relied in part
158-60 (1953); Neuborne, supra note 89, at 1115-16; Redish & Woods, CongressionalPower
to Control the Jurisdictionof Lower FederalCourts: A CriticalReview and a New Synthesis, 124 U.
PA. L. REv. 45, 97-100 (1975). These factors include the floor of competence for federal
judges ensured by presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, the increased expertise in expounding federal law that federal judges possess, and the greater hostility towards
federal law that state judges harbor.
106 Neuborne, supra note 89, at 1116 n.46. Professor Neuborne notes that although
"[n]o comparative study of the relative performance of state and federal courts in the
enforcement of constitutional rights appears to exist . . . the impact of state hostility to
Supreme Court mandates has been noted." Id.
107 The one significant departure from this policy is the Court's decision in Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In concluding that § 1983 constituted an "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute (28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)), the Court
relied heavily on extensive legislative history that revealed the framers' widespread mistrust
of the state judiciary. 407 U.S. at 238-42. For a critical analysis of the Mitchum holding, see
Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 717, 733-39 (1977).
108 The Court is not alone in refusing to reexamine traditional notions concerning the
role of state courts in the federal system. Some continue to suggest that the role of state
courts today should be measured exclusively by the framers' attitudes. See, e.g., P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLEs's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 91 (2d ed. Supp. 1977). Much, however, has happened to the
philosophy and practical realities of federalism since 1789, and the framers' concept of
state-court power is nowhere contained in the body of the Constitution.
109 Congress enacted the original version pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1789. AntiInjunction Statute, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333 (1793). The Statute is currently codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
110 The Statute provides:

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
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on the existence and historical development of the Statute to justify
adoption of the Younger doctrine.1 1 ' The Court's 1972 decision
in Mitchum v. Foster,1 2 however, renders such reliance extremely
awkward.
In Mitchum the Court held that section 1983 is an "expressly authorized" exception to the Statute's prohibitions."13 Thus the Court
apparently determined that Congress believed the need for federal
judicial enforcement of federal civil rights was so compelling that it
justified a departure from the traditional policy of avoiding disruption of the state judicial process. But Mitchum does more than render Younger's reliance upon the Anti-Injunction Statute anomalous.
In a sense, it directly undermines this final justification for Younger
deference. If the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Statute is to preserve the sanctity of the state judicial process, and if, as the Court
concluded, the Statute does not apply to civil rights suits, the sanctity of the state judicial process, according to Congress, is insufficient to overcome the need for federal protection of federal civil
rights. The issue requires more detailed analysis, however, since
Mitchum is itself a questionable decision." 4 Moreover, neither the
Court nor Congress has ever attempted to carefully balance the
interest in the integrity of the state judicial process against the need
for federal judicial protection of federal rights.
In what way does federal equitable relief interfere with the
integrity of the state judicial process? In one sense the answer is
obvious: state courts are forced to halt their proceedings while the
federal issue is litigated in federal court. This may cause piecemeal
litigation in state court and unduly delay enforcement of state law.
Although the threat to state judicial processes should not be
overestimated, there is a potential for significant disruption if the
federal courts freely enjoin on-going state proceedings any time
they conclude that a constitutional right has or has probably been
violated. Taken to its extreme, such a policy would produce absurd
results. For example, federal courts might issue injunctions every
time they conclude that state courts improperly admitted evidence

seized in violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
I Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43.
112 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
'3Id. at 243.
114"See Redish, supra note 107, at 733-39.
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unreasonable searches and seizures. But the mere possibility that
federal injunctive relief would unduly disrupt state proceedings
under certain circumstances does not imply that the broad deference called for in Younger is appropriate in all cases. Rather, federal
courts should balance, on a case-by-case basis, the danger of disruption to state proceedings against the strength of the individual's
need for immediate review by a federal tribunal. In applying such
a balancing process, 115 federal courts should invariably conclude
that some rulings, even at a constitutional level, (1) have the potential for substantial disruption of the state judicial process; (2) are
likely familiar to state courts; and (3) may ultimately be reviewed by
a federal court on a post-trial petition for habeas corpus. 116 Federal
relief would thus be limited to cases involving (1) a first amendment issue, with all its attendant "imponderables and contingencies";"17 (2) an issue not likely to arise in the majority of state
115
I have suggested elsewhere a broad balancing of competing factors to determine
whether a federal court should exercise its discretion to enjoin a state proceeding under
the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute. Id. at 753-60. This
balancing process would apply in any situation where a federal court has jurisdiction over a
case. I am now suggesting a further refinement of the process, to be applied exclusively to
civil rights suits under § 1983.
116
See 28 U.S.C. § 2554 (1970). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denying
federal habeas corpus relief based on evidentiary ruling where state court provided full
hearing on fourth amendment claim).
17 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Younger held that a "chilling effect" on first amendment interests does not by itself justify federal injunctive relief. 401
U.S. at 50. But this does not make the chilling effect any less real. Indeed, the suggested
exception to Younger should not be limited to situations where the individual federal plaintiff is merely contemplating future action. If an individual has already completed whatever
action he or she planned to take, there is no danger of "chilling" that individual's first
amendment interests. But others, who are still contemplating action, might be chilled by
the knowledge that the only protection for their first amendment rights would be a defense to a state prosecution. Such individuals would not have standing to litigate in a pending federal lawsuit involving another party (see id.at 42), but a decision in such a case might
still affect the exercise of their free-speech rights.
In cases involving first amendment challenges to statutory restrictions on free speech,
courts have held that under certain circumstances a litigant will be allowed to challenge a
statute as overbroad, even though a narrowly drawn statute could constitutionally prohibit
that litigant's speech. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
[T]he transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing "attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement
that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity." This is deemed
necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well
refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a
statute susceptible of application to protected expression.
Id. at 521 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)) (citations omitted). In
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Court limited this doctrine to cases of
"pure" speech, but still recognized that in certain instances "[1]itigants ... are permitted to
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criminal prosecutions (thus avoiding a potentially widespread impingement upon the state judicial process); or (3) an important or
recurring issue that could not subsequently be reviewed by petition
for habeas corpus (thus allowing federal relief in civil cases). 11 8 A
case-by-case balancing process, with its inherent uncertainties,
could conceivably cause a dramatic increase in the number of
frivolous attempts to obtain federal relief. But a federal court
would not be required to issue a temporary restraining order
against the state action, and a state court would not have to stay
itself pending determination of the federal case. Thus nothing
would be gained by a hopeless attempt to obtain federal relief.
Swift disposal of frivolous claims by federal courts would discourage attempts to take advantage of the uncertainties involved in the
balancing process.
CONCLUSION

If one believes that there is no functionally significant difference between federal-court and state-court adjudication of federal
rights, not even the slightest disruption of the state judicial process
is ever justified. But not even the Younger Court reached this conclusion. Younger "balanced" competing federal and state interests
by recognizing that federal judicial intervention is warranted (1)
when the prosecution is brought in bad faith or is intended to
harass; and (2) when the prosecution is under a "flagrantly and
patently" unconstitutional statute." 9 A proper understanding of
challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because
of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally, protected speech or expression." Id. at
612. The rule in Gooding protects the interests of those not parties to the case whose constitutionally protected speech might be chilled by allowing the overbroad statute to stand. I
suggest that similar considerations are relevant in delimiting the scope of Younger deference.
The reason for singling out free-expression cases is not, as one commentator has
suggested, because of the "solar position" of the first amendment right of free expression.
See B. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 838. Rather, first amendment rights by their nature cannot
be effectively protected either in a defense to a state criminal or civil action or in a postconviction federal habeas corpus action.
"' The Supreme Court has recently prohibited federal courts from reviewing statecourt fourth amendment rulings on petitions for habeas corpus where the state court has
given the defendant a full hearing on the constitutional issue. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493-94 (1976). Of course, this does not cause such rulings to fall within the third
category described in text-justifying injunctive relief-since the Court's point was simply
that a federal court should not make an inquiry at any time. The fact that Stone concerned
a habeas petition, rather than an injunctive action, was irrelevant to the Court's reasoning.
119401 U.S. at 53-54.
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the legitimate interests on both sides of the equation dictates striking the balance in a different manner. 1 0
The attraction of a balancing analysis in evaluating petitions
for federal intervention in state proceedings depends largely on
one's view of the roles to be played by federal and state courts in
enforcing federal rights. If one believes, as I do, 1 ' that modern
realities and principles of federalism dictate a presumption that an
individual should be able to vindicate his federal rights in federal
court-a presumption rebuttable only in extreme circumstancesthe balancing process suggested here offers the most reasonable
approach. It affords an individual the opportunity to vindicate
federal rights in federal court except where it would result in extreme disruption of state judicial proceedings.
Even if one rejects a balancing process in favor of full retention of the Younger doctrine, this Article suggests the need for a
reexamination of the theoretical rationales underlying Younger
deference. This reexamination should result in a reordering of the
federalistic values recognized by the Supreme Court as the bases of
the doctrine and a rejection of those bases demonstrated to be
inappropriate. If it proceeds in this manner, the Court will have
established a firmer foundation for the cooperative judicial federalism so fundamental to the nation's constitutional scheme.
120 The exception recognized by Younger for multiple prosecutions intended to harass

does seem to make sense. In such a situation, a defense to a single criminal prosecution
cannot provide an adequate remedy.
1"1 See Redish, supra note 107, at 755-57; Redish & Woods, supra note 105, at 69-70,

